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PROCEEDS FROM U.S. BONDS MATURING DURING
INCOMPETENCY OF CO-OWNER HELD
TO GO TO RESIDUARY ESTATE
In Re Sacks
173 Ohio St. 270, 181 N.R.2d 464 (1962)
Mrs. Sachs was declared mentally incompetent on August 6, 1954.
She was the co-owner of United States savings bonds which she had pur-
chased at various times prior to that date, and placed in her safe deposit
box. James Goodwin was registered as the other co-owner of the bonds.
Some of the bonds matured during her lifetime, but after she became in-
competent. Her guardians cashed most of these bonds and deposited the
proceeds in the guardianship savings accounts.' She did not make a specific
bequest of the bonds in her will. After her death, the guardians paid the
proceeds of the previously matured bonds to the executors of her estate, but
delivered the unmatured bonds which were held by them at the time of her
death to Goodwin, the co-owner, as the survivor. Goodwin, who had furnished
none of the purchase price and to whom delivery was never made, filed ex-
ceptions to four accounts submitted by the guardians. The probate court
overruled the exceptions, and the court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed.2 The supreme court held that no part of the proceeds of
the matured bonds vested in the co-owner upon the death of the ward.
Rather, the proceeds became part of Mrs. Sachs' residuary estate to be
distributed in accordance with her will.3
The form of registration of United States savings bonds is restricted
to (1) A as the sole owner; (2) A or B as co-owners; or (3) A as owner,
payable on A's death to B.4 Payment of bonds registered in the name of
a sole owner will be made to the registered owner and upon his death to the
person established as owner by testamentary proceedings.5 The proceeds
from bonds registered in the co-owner form will be paid to either co-owner
who presents the bond.6 Survivorship bond payment will be made to the
registered owner during his lifetime and to the beneficiary upon proof of the
owner's death. 7 The treasury regulations provide that the registration of
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 2109.42 (1953) provides:
A fiduciary who has funds belonging to a trust which are not required for
current expenditures shall, unless otherwise ordered by the probate court,
invest or deposit such funds within a reasonable time according to Sec-
tion 2109.37 of the Revised Code.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2109.37 lists approved investments for trust funds.
2 In Re Sachs, 173 Ohio St. 270, 181 N.E.2d 464 (1962).
8 The supreme court further stated that if the guardians had been negligent in
not cashing the matured bonds they would have been liable for the loss of interest.
4 31 C.F.R. § 315.7 (1959). See Comment, 7 Kan. L. Rev. 512 (1959).
5 31 C.F.R. § 315.55 (1959).
6 31 C.F.R. § 315.60 (1959).
7 31 C.F.R. § 315.65(a) (1959).
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the bonds is conclusive of ownership.8 In either the co-owner or the benefi-
ciary situation, if A dies without surrendering the bonds, B will be the
owner.
9
Disanto's Estate'° held that the regulations of the Treasury Department
control the ownership of savings bonds. The exceptor in the principal case
contended that Mrs. Sachs, while competent, made a contract with the
United States government for the primary benefit of the exceptor, a third
party, who thereby acquired a definite right, title and interest in the matured
bonds as co-owner. The court rejected this argument stating that the
matured bonds did not pass to the co-owner as a gift inter vivos or causa
mortis because Mrs. Sachs had never given him possession of the bonds, or
control over them. The court in effect held that the right to the bonds did
not vest in him as third-party beneficiary because by the terms of the con-
tract it terminated prior to her death. The court also found that Mrs. Sachs
knew the contract would mature in twelve years, at which time the bonds
would no longer produce income. Therefore, the only reasonable inference
to be drawn from these facts is that had Mrs. Sachs remained competent,
she would have redeemed the bonds at maturity. This inference does not
necessarily arise when the bonds are specifically bequeathed by will, or when
the deceased's intent is evidenced by a form of ownership providing for
survivorship. The guardian is the mere conservator of his ward's property,
and as such he has no power to change the ward's estate after death or men-
tal incompetency, when the testator is powerless to act himself."
Although Sacks is a case of first impression in Ohio, an Illinois decision,
In Re Estate of Hirsk, is factually similar.' 2 In Hirsk, however, part of the
bonds had matured before the appointment of a guardian, but had not been
redeemed by the ward although she was competent to do so. The guardian
of the ward's estate cashed the bonds and reinvested the proceeds.' 3 The
court held that the rights of the parties were fixed as of the time the de-
ceased became incompetent and therefore the co-owner became entitled to
the proceeds from the bonds upon death of the deceased. The court in Hirsk
determined that the controlling question was whether Mrs. Hirsh intended
to give the bonds to the co-owner at the time that she became incompetent.
An affirmative intention was found to exist from the failure of Mrs. Hirsh
to redeem the bonds after maturity and from her specific mention of the
bonds in her will where she stated that she had provided for certain friends
by purchasing government bonds for them. Hirsk is distinguishable on its
facts from Sacks, in which the bonds had not matured until after the pur-
chaser had been declared incompetent, and in which the will made no mention
of the bonds.
8 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1959).
9 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959).
10 142 Ohio St. 223, 51 N.E.2d 639 (1943).
11 Zuber v. Zuber, 93 Ohio App. 195, 112 N.E.2d 688 (1952).
12 In Re Estate of Hirsh, 27 Ill. App. 2d 228, 169 N.E.2d 591 (1960).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 412 (1959) requires conservators to keep their ward's
property invested.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In Sachs no question of ademption of legacies is involved because there
was no bequest of the bonds in the will of Mrs. Sachs. However, if she had
made a specific legacy of such bonds in her will to a named beneficiary, the
problem of ademption would arise.
Ademption takes place where either (1) a specific thing bequeathed is
not in existence at the testator's death; or (2) where a testator, in his life-
time, had made a gift or provision for the legatee as a substitute for the be-
quest and evidencing an intention to revoke or cancel the bequest. 14 The
ademption in (1) occurs by the loss, destruction, consumption, or substantial
change in the legacy or devise during the life of the testator so as to make
it impossible to carry out the provisions in the will. 15
Two different theories have been used by the courts in dealing with
exchanged property to determine if an ademption of a specific legacy has
occurred.' 6 The Identity Theory states that if the identical subject matter
of the legacy has been disposed of or destroyed so that it does not form a
part of the testator's estate at the time of his death, the legacy is extin-
guished or adeemed, and the legatee's rights are gone, regardless of the testa-
tor's intention. 17 The Intention Theory holds that legacies are adeemed only
when the testator apparently so intended.' 8
In dealing with the altering of an incompetent's property by a guardian,
some courts have held that the guardian has no power to change the ward's
estate and the devolution thereof in accordance with his will, except to make
necessary provisions for the maintenance of the ward.19 Ohio has recognized
the principle that the guardian cannot modify the will of his ward in Roder-
ick v. Fisher,20 and Bishop v. Fulmer.2 The Sacks decision, if applied to
bonds included in testamentary bequests, would have the effect not only of
14 56 0. Jur. 2d Wills § 873 (1963).
15 Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 770 (1957).
16 Roderick v. Fisher, 97 Ohio App. 95, 122 N.E.2d 475 (1954).
17 28 R.C.L. 345, § 341 (1921).
18 Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 F. 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1910).
19 Supra note 15, at 774.
20 Roderick v. Fisher, supra note 16, held that the Intention Theory would apply
to a case where a guardian is appointed for a person of unsound mind to prevent an
ademption by concluding that the intention of the testator expressed in his will should
be preserved, and a sale by the guardian should not operate to change the will or the
effect of the disposition as it existed at the time of its execution. In Fisher, however, the
testator was merely physically incompetent and could express his intention up until his
death in the same manner as a normal person. For this reason the court found that an
ademption had occurred for the testator was presumed to know the full legal effect of the
sale of property which had been specifically devised in his will.
21 112 Ohio App. 140, 175 N.E.2d 209 (1960). The testator made a devise of real
property in his will, then was later adjudged a mentally incompetent person and placed
under a guardian. Prior to the testator's death the guardian sold the property, but
the court held that the sale of the property did not operate as an ademption if the
testator remained mentally incompetent and lacked testamentary capacity to make a
new will at the time of the sale and continuing until his death. Since there was no
ademption the original legatee received the proceeds of the sale.
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permitting, but requiring guardians to modify the disposition of the ward's
estate as expressed, during his competency, by his will. This would occur
when a guardian cashes matured bonds given in a specific bequest, as required
by statute.22 If Sacks should be applied in this situation, the residuary lega-
tees would be entitled to the proceeds of the bonds.
The court in Sacks clearly limited its decision to the particular facts
of the case, but it may be argued that it should be applied to cases in which
a testator has made a specific bequest of a bond in his will. Such an applica-
tion of Sachs would result in an extension of guardianship powers by allow-
ing a guardian to defeat the will of a ward by the redemption of savings
bonds that were specifically bequeathed. It appears from the previously
decided Ohio cases that Sachs, while correctly decided, should not be ex-
tended to situations where a specific bequest of savings bonds had been
previously made by a ward. In such a case, while the guardian could cash
the bonds and reinvest the proceeds, such proceeds plus any accrued in-
terest thereon remaining after the death of the testator should go to the
legatee.2
3
22 Ohio Rev. Code § 2109.42 (1953), supra note 1.
23 In Re Estate of Hirsh, supra note 12, at 595.

